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ARTICLES
"Experience Must Be Our Only Guide":
The State Constitutional Experience of
the Framers of the Federal
Constitution
by ROBERT F. WILLIAMS*
One might almost say that the romance, the poetry and even
the drama of American politics are deeply embedded in the many
state constitutions promulgated since the publication of Paine's




William Gladstone said the federal Constitution was "the most won-
derful work ever struck off at a given time by the hand and purpose of
man."' 2 He did not, however, mean by this note of praise that the Consti-
tution was literally invented or cut from whole cloth at the Philadelphia
Convention in the summer of 1787. The drafting of the federal Constitu-
tion was, rather, the culmination of approximately two hundred years of
unique American constitutional development. The colonial period,
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This Article is part of a larger study of the influences of the early state constitutions on
the federal Constitution. See Williams, Evolving State Legislative and Executive Power During
the Founding Decade, forthcoming in 496 ANNALS 43 (1988) [hereinafter Williams, Founding
Decade; Williams, The Influences of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution on American Constitu-
tionalism During the Founding Decade, 112 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 25 (1988). The
author gratefully acknowledges financial assistance from the American Council of Learned
Societies and a research leave from Rutgers University, both of which made the research for
this study possible. The author also received valuable research assistance from William Agee.
1. J. DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 11 (1915).
2. Gladstone, Kin Beyond the Sea, 127 N. AM. REV. 179, 185 (1878), quoted in Hutson,
The Creation of the Constitution: Scholarship at a Standstill, 12 REVS. AM. HIsT. 463, 467
(1984).
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which saw the evolution of colonial charters, and the first decade of inde-
pendence, during which the first state constitutions were adopted, pre-
ceded the federal Constitution.3 As author Willi Paul Adams noted,
however, these first attempts to secure individual liberties and establish a
system of governance "have lost their primacy of place to the Constitu-
tion of 1787/1788."1 He continued, "Essentially, the basic structure of
the federal Constitution of 1787 was that of certain of the existing state
constitutions writ large." 5
Constitutional scholars have recognized that many of the features of
the United States Constitution were modeled on the earlier state consti-
tutions.6 This is clear despite current controversies over the reliability of
Constitutional Convention records, 7 or their relevance in determining the
"intent" of the Framers with respect to specific issues.' American consti-
tutionalism did not begin in 1787. The federal Constitution actually rep-
resents the chronological midpoint in the continuing process of
American constitutional development. Therefore, if 1987 was the Bicen-
tennial of the federal Constitution, it may be described more properly as
the Quadricentennial of American constitutionalism.
3. "The federal constitution was not the beginning but the climax of American institu-
tional development." Webster, Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the American
Revolution, 9 ANNALS 380, 416 (1897).
4. W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND
THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 4 (1980).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 128-29, 203-04 (1913); C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
SUPREME COURT 22-39 (1935).
For example, Peter Hoffer and Natalie Hull observed:
The transformation of impeachment from a check against monarchical misdeeds
to an instrument of republican government was first explored in state governments
before 1787, and fully realized in the federal Constitution. Between 1776 and 1787,
state politicians drafted and tested various provisions for impeachment. Delegates to
the federal convention-Madison, Randolph, Paterson, Mason, and Hamilton-sup-
ported by the voices and votes of other knowledgeable state leaders, fashioned na-
tional impeachment provisions along lines laid down in the states' constitutions.
P. HOFFER & N. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 68 (1984).
Justice Frankfurter, in interpreting the federal Constitution's congressional immunity
provisions, noted that "[t]he provision ... was a reflection of the political principles already
firmly established in the States. Three State Constitutions adopted before the federal Constitu-
tion specifically protected the privilege." Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1965).
7. See, e.g., Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1986) (treating questions about the reliability of federal constitu-
tional convention records).
8. See Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This
Constitution", 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987), and materials cited therein.
EXPERIENCE OF THE FRAMERS
I. The Framers and the State Constitutional Experience of the
Founding Decade
The fifty-five delegates who attended the 1787 Constitutional Con-
vention already had wide experience, either directly or indirectly, with
constitutional theory and constitution-making.9 Sydney Fisher described
this experience as follows:
When Massachusetts sent her delegates, in the year 1787, to
frame the National Constitution, she had had over a hundred and
fifty years' experience in constitution-tinkering. During that time
she had lived under two charters, a constitution, and an interreg-
num, when she had neither charter nor constitution and was under
the direct rule of the Crown .... During the Revolution she made
for herself a constitution which was rejected by her people, but
before the Revolution closed she made another, which was
accepted. 1O
By the time the Constitutional Convention met in the summer of 1787,
the thirteen independent states had debated, framed, adopted, rejected,
and modified at least twenty state constitutions. 1 This count includes
Vermont's constitution (the state was not formally admitted to the Union
until 1791) and the Connecticut and Rhode Island charters, which were
modified and retained in place of formally adopted constitutions. 12 A
9. One scholar estimated that "one-third to one-half of the members of the federal con-
vention had been members of the conventions which framed the several state constitutions and
a very large number of the members of the various ratifying conventions had also had a part in
the formation of the respective state constitutions." Webster, supra note 3, at 417. See also J.
JAMESON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE STATES 18 (1886).
"Many of the Philadelphia delegates had joined in preparing these instruments," observed
James Bryce, "[and] all had been able to watch and test their operation. They compared notes
as to the merits, tested by practice, of the devices which their States had respectively adopted."
I J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 27 (2d rev. ed. 1891).
10. S. FISHER, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 20-21
(1897).
11. For excellent summaries of this decade of state constitution-making, see W. ADAMS,
supra note 4, at 63-93; E. DOUGLASS, REBELS AND DEMOCRATS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS AND MAJORITY RULE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1955); J. MAIN, THE SOVEREIGN STATES, 1775-1783, at 143-85 (1973); G. WOOD, THE CRE-
ATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 125-255 (1969). For a dated, but still
useful summary, see A. NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE
REVOLUTION, 1775-1789, at 117-205 (1924).
12. "The institutions written into the American Constitution were heavily dependent on
colonial experience and practice, as well as upon the framers' experience of having written and
lived under eighteen state constitutions between 1776 and 1786." D. LUTZ, POPULAR CON-
SENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS 1 (1980). See also S. FISHER, supra note 10, at 8. Fisher lists 17 state constitutions,
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number of leading federal convention delegates, such as James Madison 3
and George Mason14 of Virginia, Benjamin Franklin 5 and Gouverneur
Morris 6 of Pennsylvania, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney17 and John
Rutledge i" of South Carolina, had earlier played important roles in draft-
ing their state constitutions. The same can be said, however, of many
lesser known delegates such as John Blair' 9 of Virginia; Richard Bas-
sett2° and George Read2' of Delaware; Elbridge Gerry,22 Nathaniel
Gorham,23 and Caleb Strong24 of Massachusetts; Daniel of St. Thomas
Jenifer25 of Maryland; William Paterson26 of New Jersey; John Lang-
don27 of New Hampshire; and Robert Yates28 of New York. Finally,
including those that were rejected. Lutz adds the Massachusetts Charter, under which that
state operated from 1776 until 1780, to reach his total of eighteen. D. LuTz, supra, at 47.
In addition, several other documents are relevant to this analysis. For example, tempo-
rary frames of government were adopted prior to constitutions in states such as Georgia and
North Carolina. See W. ADAMS, supra note 4, at 82-83 (Georgia); id. at 81 (North Carolina).
Several New Hampshire drafts were proposed and rejected between 1778 and 1784. See E.
DOUGLASS, supra note 11, at 329-39; J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 215-16. Drafts of a constitu-
tion for the "state" of Frankland (part of North Carolina) were circulated and discussed, and a
constitutional convention was held in 1784 by persons seeking to create a separate state. See
W. ADAMS, supra note 4, at 94-95; W. BREWSTER, THE FOURTEENTH COMMONWEALTHS:
VERMONT AND THE STATES THAT FAILED 181 (1960); W. DODD, THE REVISION AND
AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 34 n.10 (1910). Many men, including James
Madison, gave advice on a constitution for Kentucky, which was not admitted to the Union
until 1792. Letter from Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785) in 8 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 350-58 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1973). See J. COWARD, KENTUCKY
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 11 (1979). "Kentucky
became something of a testing ground, a focus, for the debate upon constitutional ideas, as-
sumptions and structures." Id. at 3.
13. R. KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 68-72 (1971).
14. H. MILLER, GEORGE MASON: GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY 138-59 (1975); R.
RUTLAND, GEORGE MASON: RELUCTANT STATESMAN 49-63 (1961).
15. D. MCGEE, FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 180 (1968).
16. Morris played an important role in New York leading to the state's constitution of
1777. E. DOUGLASS, supra note 11, at 63-65; see M. MINTZ, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 68-87 (1970).
17. E. DOUGLASS, supra note 11, at 35-41.
18. Id. at 35, 41.
19. H. MILLER, supra note 14, at 240; Drinard, John Blair, Jr., 1732-1800, 39 PROC.
ANN. MEETING VA. ST. B. 436, 439 (1927).
20. J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 165.
21. Reed, The Delaware Constitution of 1776, 6 DEL. NOTES 7, 21 (1930).
22. 1 J. AUSTIN, THE LIFE OF ELDRIDGE GERRY 78 (1928-1929).
23. D. MCGEE, supra note 15, at 60.
24. R. PETERS, THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1790: A SOCIAL COMPACT 21
(1974).
25. R. HOFFMAN, A SPIRIT OF DISSENSION: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE REVOLU-
TION IN MARYLAND 206 (1973).
26. D. MCGEE, supra note 15, at 136.
27. J. DANIELL, EXPERIMENT IN REPUBLICANISM: NEW HAMPSHIRE POLITICS AND
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1741-1794, at 168-69 (1970).
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some of the most well-known figures associated with the federal Consti-
tution, but who were not delegates in 1787, such as Thomas Jefferson, 9
John Adams,3" and John Jay,31 had had direct involvement with develop-
ing their state constitutions.
With the end to British rule at Independence, there was a high de-
gree of discussion, trading of ideas, copying of texts, and argument about
the fundamental questions of governmental structure within the states as
well as among them. Thus, when the Continental Congress convened in
Philadelphia, the delegates were aware of the need for new state constitu-
tions and the controversies surrounding them.32 State constitutions, even
draft versions, 3 were published in Philadelphia newspapers, and all of
the well-known pamphlets on state constitutions were available to the
congressional delegates.34 Philadelphia thus became the center of debate
over state constitutions, where many of the future federal constitutional
convention delegates took part in the debates.
As early as July 15, 1776, Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire, which
had already adopted a temporary state constitution in January 1776,
wrote home from Philadelphia to John Langdon, a future delegate to the
federal Constitutional Convention, that the constitutions "of Virginia
and New Jersey are in this city. I shall send them forward, and the Con-
stitutions of the other Colonies as they are formed, as possibly something
may be taken from them to amend our own."3 5 This interest in, and
direct involvement with, the state constitutions continued through the
decade leading up to the 1787 Constitutional Convention.
28. A. YOUNG, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICANS OF NEW YORK: THE ORIGINS, 1763-
1797, at 17 (1967).
29. H. MILLER, supra note 14, at 146, 157-58, 161; 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 217-316 (J. Boyd ed. 1952) [hereinafter J. BOYD]; Anderson, Jefferson and the Virginia
Constitution, 21 AM. HIST. REV. 750 (1916); Swindler, Virginia Constitutional Commentaries:
The Formative Period, 1776-1803, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 358, 366-69 (1979).
30. R. PETERS, supra note 24, at 13-14, 23-24.
31. JOHN JAY: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY-UNPUBLISHED PAPERS 1745-
1780, at 389-418 (R. Morris ed. 1975) [hereinafter JOHN JAY]; B. MASON, THE ROAD TO
INDEPENDENCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK, 1773-1777, at 225
(1966).
32. W. ADAMS, supra note 4, at 94 n.I11.
33. H. MILLER, supra note 14, at 154.
34. P. SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776: A STUDY IN REVOLU-
TIONARY DEMOCRACY 172 n.1 1, 173-75 (1936). Those in other states took a special interest in
the drafting of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 171 (quoting Pa. Evening Post, July 30,
1776).
35. Letter from Josiah Bartlett to John Langdon (July 15, 1776) in 4 LETTERS OF THE
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 459, 460 (P. Smith ed. 1980) [hereinafter P. SMITH],
quoted in R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 44 (1955). Rut-
Spring 19881
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
II. State Constitution-Making During the Founding Decade
Immediately prior to Independence, and for the decade that fol-
lowed, the states, in the words of historian Jackson Turner Main, "be-
came the laboratories for testing theories, trying the institutions in the
various forms that presently appeared in the constitutions of the United
States and other countries."36 Contemporaries of this period understood
the experimental nature of these efforts at constitution-making. In 1778,
for example, Thomas Paine applauded "the happy opportunity of trying
a variety, in order to discover the best .... By diversifying the several
constitutions, we shall see which State flourish the best, and out of the
many posterity may choose a model . .
This experimentation in constitution-making was evident in the
New York Constitution of 1777. Article VI, dealing with the transition
from voice voting to the use of ballots, provided for "a fair experiment"
with ballot voting after the war was over.38 "[A]fter a full and fair experi-
ment shall be made of voting by ballot," the provision continued, the
legislature could return to voice voting, but only by a two-thirds vote.39
land quotes Bartlett as referring to the constitutions of Virginia and New York. This must be
incorrect because New York's constitution was not adopted until April 1777.
William Hooper wrote from Philadelphia on October 27, 1776, to Joseph Hewes: "I in-
close you the Constitutions of several states for the speculation of yourself and friends." 5 P.
SMITH, supra, at 407, 410.
36. Main, The American States in the Revolutionary Era, in SOVEREIGN STATES IN AN
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 1, 23 (R. Hoffman & P. Albert eds. 1981).
Justice Brandeis' better known description of the states as "laboratories" was in reference
to state legislative innovations at the beginning of the twentieth century. New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("social experiments ... in the insulated cham-
bers afforded by the several States ...").
37. A Serious Address to the People of Pennsylvania on the Present Situation of their Af-
fairs, in PENNSYLVANIA PACKET (Dec. 1, 1778), reprinted in 2 P. FONER, THE COMPLETE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 277, 281 (1969).
The author of the 1776 pamphlet, Four Letters on Interesting Subjects, argued:
Perhaps most of the Colonies will have two houses, and it will probably be of benefit
to have some little difference in the forms of government, as those which do not like
one, may reside in another, and by trying different experiments, the best form will the
sooner be found out, as the preference at present rests on conjecture.
Anonymous, Four Letters on Interesting Subjects, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DUR-
ING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, at 368, 387 (C. Hyneman & D. Lutz eds. 1983). See also
D. HAWKE, IN THE MIDST OF A REVOLUTION 196-97 (1961). Contemporary Thomas Smith
wrote rather bitterly about the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention: "You know
that experimental philosophy was in great repute fifty years ago, and we have a mind to try
how the same principle will succeed in politics!" Id. at 191.
38. N.Y. CONST. art. VI (1777) in 7 W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 173-74 (1978).
39. Id.
Wol. 15:403
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The "founding decade",' half of it while the Revolution was still in
progress, 41 reflected an intense and concentrated focus on written consti-
tutional theory and practice.42 Delegates to the Continental Congress
complained that their colleagues were neglecting national issues and re-
turning home to work on their state constitutions. "Constitutions employ
every pen," complained one delegate.43 Thomas Jefferson unsuccessfully
sought permission to return to Virginia to work on the state constitution,
arguing that "it is the whole object of the present controversy." 44 As
Carl Becker later wrote, this decade witnessed the internal political
struggle over "who should rule at home" as well as the Revolutionary
War struggle for "home rule."' 45 Even if one does not accept Becker's
40. This is Martin Diamond's term for the period 1776 to 1787. See Diamond, Decent,
Even Though Democratic, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 18, 24 (R. Goldwin
& W. Schambra eds. 1980).
41. When reading the first state constitutions it is easy to forget that most of them were
drafted and adopted during wartime. Cecelia Kenyon noted:
If it is difficult for us to imagine Washington or Jefferson captured by the British
and shot or hanged as traitors, it is even more difficult to remember that every mem-
ber of the state assemblies or conventions that drafted constitutions was publicly
committing himself to the Revolution and therefore placing his life in jeopardy
should the Revolution fail ....
Kenyon, Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America, in NoMos XX: CONSTITUTIONALISM
84, 91-92 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979).
The issues of independence and military confrontation had a major impact on many of the
state constitution drafters, particularly in Pennsylvania and New York. See E. COUNTRYMAN,
A PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY IN
NEw YORK, 1760-1790, at 163-65 (1981). Certainly, no similar statement could be made
about the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
42. William Morey observed in 1893 that "the most eventful constitution-making epoch
in our history was not the year 1787, but an antecedent period extending from 1776 to 1780."
Morey, The First State Constitutions, 4 ANNALS 201, 201 (1893).
Harry Cushing asserted: "In the history of the use of the written constitution as a basis of
government, no period so brief has been marked by such activity in constituent proceedings
and by such political path-breaking as the decade of the American Revolution." Cushing,
"The People the Best Governors," 1 AM. HIST. REV. 284, 284 (1896). See also B. WRIGHT,
CONSENSUS AND CONTINUITY, 1776-1787, at 89 (1958) (suggesting that the 1787 Convention
would have been a failure without "the example, experience, and the constructive achieve-
ments of 1776 and the years immediately thereafter.").
43. Letter from Francis L. Lee to Landin Carter (Nov. 9, 1776) in 5 P. SMITH, supra note
35, at 461, 463 (emphasis in original).
44. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson (May 16, 1776) in 4 P. SMITH, supra
note 35, at 12, 13.
45. C. BECKER, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE PROVINCE OF NEw
YORK, 1760-1776, at 22 (1909).
From 1765 to 1776, therefore, two questions, about equally prominent, deter-
mined party history. The first was whether essential colonial rights should be main-
tained; the second was by whom and by what methods they should be maintained.
The first was the question of home rule; the second was the question, if we may so
put it, of who should rule at home.
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assertion that the struggle over who should rule at home began prior to
the Revolution, one must concede that this domestic constitutional issue
was a central focus, together with military victory, from 1776 to 1787.
The state constitutions forged during this period thus formed the
"connecting links" 46 between the unique American colonial institutions
that had evolved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the fed-
eral Constitution framed in 1787. Although it is impossible to under-
stand these early state constitutions without referring to the evolution of
colonial charters and institutions, the state constitutions clearly provided
the most immediate frame of reference for the convention delegates in
1787. They are, even today, in the words of James Bryce, "a mine of
instruction for the natural history of democratic communities."'47 The
very idea of a specialized constitutional convention followed by a sepa-
rate mechanism for popular ratification, which apparently was an obvi-
ous procedure by 1787, was the product of a painstaking period of trial
and error with constitution-making processes in the states from 1776 to
1787." 8 Notably, the earlier Articles of Confederation had been drafted
by the Congress and ratified by the state legislatures.49
Several important points have become much clearer since earlier
studies of the state constitution-making during the founding decade. It is
now apparent, for example, that a greater fundamental controversy and
diversity of opinion existed in the state constitution-making experience
than was earlier thought. As one historian noted:
46. "The chief historical significance which attaches to the first State constitutions rests in
the fact that they were the connecting links between the previous organic law of the colonies
and the subsequent organic law of the Federal Union." Morey, supra note 42, at 202 (empha-
sis added).
A similar observation was made by James Bryce: "The State Constitutions are the oldest
things in the political history of America, for they are continuations and representatives of the
royal colonial charters, whereby the earliest English settlements in America were created. .. ."
1 J. BRYCE, supra note 9, at 413. See also R. SCHUYLER, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 15-16 (1923).
47. 1 J. BRYCE, supra note 9, at 434.
James Dealey referred to state constitutions as "a cinematoscope of the times." J.
DEALEY, supra note 1, at 2.
48. See generally W. ADAMS, supra note 4, at 63-98; 1 R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800,
at 213-35 (1959); Tate, The Social Contract in America: Revolutionary Theory as a Conserva-
tive Instrument, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 375 (1965).
For an in-depth study of social contract theory in Massachusetts, see R. PETERS, THE
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780: A SOCIAL COMPACT (1978).
49. See generally M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774-
1781 (1940).
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Large numbers of those unable to vote or hold political office felt
that the primary purpose of the [Revolutionary War] was to abol-
ish the political institutions by which privilege had been main-
tained in the colonial governments. Thus when the question of
home rule was succeeded by the question of who would rule at
home, these groups of humbler rebels attempted to obtain equal
consideration for themselves by demanding that democratic re-
forms be written into the new state constitutions.50
Controversy surrounded both substantive questions of state consti-
tutional content and procedural questions concerning the process of
drafting and adopting the state constitutions. There was a wide range of
opinion even within the general consensus that the new state govern-
ments should be "republican." In fact, this consensus was one "that pro-
moted discord rather than harmony."51  These differing interests,
initially clashing over the framing of the first state constitutions, formed
the basis of the political parties that lasted into the early nineteenth
century.52
The ultimate outcomes of the constitutional battles in the states
were much closer and more contingent than has been commonly recog-
nized. Most studies of the early state constitutions focus exclusively on
the documents as finally adopted. 3 Those whose ideas did not prevail
have been forgotten5 4 in much the same way that the antifederalists were,
until recently, forgotten.5 Despite their relative obscurity today, the un-
successful arguments in the framing of the state constitutions were not
lost on the delegates in Philadelphia in 1787.
To a certain extent, investigating the constitutional theories and
political positions of those who did not prevail in most of the early state
50. E. DOUGLASS, supra note 11, at vi. See also M. JENSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION WITHIN AMERICA 50-51 0974); G. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE,
POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 340 (1979).
51. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of
Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49, 72 (1972). See also R.
KELLEY, THE CULTURAL PATTERN IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE FIRST CENTURY 68-69
(1979); Bloch, The Constitution and Culture, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 550 (1987).
52. See generally J. MAIN, POLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION (1973)
(tracing the early development of political parties).
53. See, e.g., Morey, supra note 42; Webster, supra note 3; Black, The Formation of the
First State Constitutions, 7 CONST. REv. 22, 31 (1923) (noting "ready acceptance of closely
parallel institutions, formulas and political ideas").
54. Donald Lutz pointed out the importance of ideas that were rejected at the state consti-
tutional conventions, in addition to those that were adopted. See D. LUTZ, supra note 12, at 1.
These rejected ideas undoubtedly were fresh in the minds of the delegates to the federal Consti-
tutional Convention in 1787.
55. See C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS (1966); H. STORING, THE COMPLETE AN-
TIFEDERALIST (1981). Difficult as it was to collect the materials for the Antifederalists, the
task is multiplied many times when looking at the state constitutions. But see infra note 57.
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constitutional conventions calls for a view of the conventions "from the
bottom up," 6 or for "listening to the 'inarticulate.'"" The ideas of
these early constitutional theorists provide an important alternative per-
spective on what is too often portrayed as a consensus view of the proper
constitution of government during the founding decade.5"
It now appears, for example, that there was a fairly widespread, rad-
ically democratic vision of a proper state constitution and the process for
its adoption, which arose to some extent during the framing of most of
the state constitutions. Jesse Lemisch, an historian of the "inarticulate",
notes that "there existed in 1776 a body of political thought which did
not endorse deference" to traditional elites.59 Although historians con-
sider this assertion controversial, some documentation exists to support
the thesis.6" Even in the absence of documentation, asserts Lemisch, less
articulate people must have shared these ideas "directly out of the actual
experience of their lives."'" A good example of this was the demand,
made at gunpoint, by voters in five Maryland counties that they were
"qualified" to vote for delegates to the state constitutional convention of
1776 despite their inability to meet the formal property ownership re-
quirements.62 Failure to take account of these alternative visions has re-
sulted in state constitutional studies based only on "examinations of the
minority at the top."63
56. Lemisch, The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up, in TOWARDS A NEW
PAST: DISSENTING ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (B. Bernstein ed. 1968).
57. Lemisch, Listening to the "Inarticulate" William Widger's Dream and the Loyalties
of American Revolutionary Seamen in British Prisons, 3 J. Soc. HIST. 1 (1969-1970).
Because, with creativity and hard work, documents reflecting the views of the people
toward the bottom of society can be uncovered, Lemisch asks "is it not time that we put
'inarticulate' in quotation marks and begin to see the term more as a judgment on the failure of
historians than as a description of historiographical reality?" Id. at 28-29. Thus, Charles
Mullet's comment about the "inarticulate" that though their history "is worthy, its achieve-
ment must be left to God" is fundamentally inaccurate. See Mullett, Book Review, 35 J.S.
HIST. 77, 78 (1969) (reviewing TOWARDS A NEW PAST: DISSENTING EsSAYS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (B. Bernstein ed. 1968)).
58. Donald Lutz observed the tendency to emphasize the continuities in constitutional
development between the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the federal Constitution of
1787. He concluded: "A careful examination of state constitutions written in the period be-
tween these two documents will reveal that the discontinuities are more important." D. LuTz,
supra note 12, at xv.
59. Lemisch, supra note 56, at 16.
60. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
61. Lemisch, supra note 56, at 16.
62. R. HOFFMAN, supra note 25, at 169-70.
63. Lemisch, supra note 56, at 4. "[S]ympathy with the victims of historical processes and
skepticism about the victors' claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the
dominant mythology." Id. at 5 (quoting B. MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP
EXPERIENCE OF THE FRAMERS
Except in the case of Massachusetts,' 4 the early stages of state con-
stitutional development are not well documented.65 There are at least
thirteen separate stories regarding state constitutional development,66
none of which is completely understood today. Some important patterns,
however, are generally discernable.
Historians67 and political scientists68 have identified two major
"waves" of state constitution-making during the founding decade. The
key point in the first wave was the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776; the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was the central feature of the second
wave. "The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution," asserts Donald Lutz,
"was the most important one written between 1776 and 1789 because it
embodied the Whig theory of republican government, which came to
dominate state level politics; the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution was the
second most important because it embodied the strongest alternative.
69
The first wave of state constitutions is generally seen to include
those adopted during the first year after Independence. 70 For the most
part, legislative bodies hastily drafted new constitutions at the beginning
AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 522-23
(1966)).
"The history of the powerless, the inarticulate, the poor has not yet begun to be written
because they have been treated no more fairly by historians than they have been treated by
their contemporaries." Id. at 9. See also Lemisch, Radical Plot in Boston (1770): A Study in
the Use of Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 485, 501-03 (1970) (reviewing H. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON
MASSACRE (1970) (expressing Lemisch's views about the history of the inarticulate)).
64. See, e.g., THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE
MASSACHUSETrS CONSTITUTION OF 1780 (0. & M. Handlin eds. 1966); R. PETERS, supra
note 24; R. TAYLOR, MASSACHUSETTS, COLONY TO COMMONWEALTH: DOCUMENTS ON
THE FORMATION OF ITS CONSTITUTION, 1775-1780 (1961); PROVINCE IN REBELLION: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHU-
SErrs, 1774-1775 (L. Wroth ed. 1975); Celia, The People of Massachusetts, A New Rebuplic,
and the Constitution of 1780: The Evolution of Principles of Popular Control of Political Au-
thority 1774-1780, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 975 (1980).
65. Kenyon, supra note 41, at 92.
66. See C. BROWNE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, FROM INDEPENDENCE
TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENT UNION, 1776-1959: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1973). John
Adams contended in 1786 that "[tihere have been in fact 13 Revolutions, for that number of
established governments were overthrown and as many new ones erected." M. JENSEN, supra
note 49, at 1. See also J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 455 ("anyone trying to develop a general
understanding of the period must read the original sources.").
67. See, e.g., G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 435.
68. See, e.g., D. LUTz, supra note 12, at 44-45.
69. Id. at 129. See also C. KENYON, supra note 55, at xxx (noting that some commenta-
tors focus on differences among state constitutions "emerging from sharp conflict between
democratic and antidemocratic forces, with the constitutions of Pennsylvania and Massachu-
setts representing respectively the victories of the two sides."); Kenyon, supra note 41, at 92.
70. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. (1776), 6 W. SWINDLER, supra note 38, at 449 (1976); VA.
CONST. (1776), 10 W. SWINDLER, supra note 38, at 48 (1979); DEL. CONST. (1776), 2 W.
SWINDLER, supra note 38, at 197 (1973).
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of the Revolution. These new constitutions did not differ much from the
colonial charters they replaced except in providing weakened executive
power and including declarations of rights. The drafters gave little con-
sideration to structural mechanisms to check the dominant legislatures,
though South Carolina's constitution of 1776 contained an absolute gu-
bernatorial veto. I Most of these constitutions also created upper houses
within their legislatures.
Although the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution did not fit this de-
scription in a number of respects, 72 it represented the culmination of the
first wave and the direct stimulus for the second wave. Pennsylvania's
radical constitutional plan was drafted by a special convention elected for
that purpose, and it followed Thomas Paine's brief recommendations in
Common Sense73 that "simple" republican governments, with a wide
elective franchise and a minimum of "aristocratic" features such as upper
houses and other impediments to the expressed will of the people, be
established.
The second wave was much longer than the first, lasting from 1777,
when the New York constitution was adopted, to 1780, when Massachu-
setts finally adopted its 1780 constitution. 74 The state constitutions of
the second wave were adopted in a more deliberate fashion, often by spe-
cially elected conventions. These second wave documents reflected a di-
rect concern with mechanisms to check actions by the dominant
legislative branches. This was the approach recommended in 1776 by
John Adams in Thoughts on Government.7" Adams had set forth an al-
ternate, more traditional vision of how the new state governments should
be constituted. He proposed a model based upon "balanced govern-
ment", or checks and balances, to which bicameralism and executive
power were central. He also advocated property requirements for holding
office and voting.
71. S.C. CONST. art. VII (1776), 8 W. SWINDLER, supra note 38, at 464 (1979). But see
infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
72. Pennsylvania's 1776 constitution was framed by a constitutional convention elected
for that purpose. It included only a unicameral legislature with no upper house and contained
an early mechanism to seek out constitutional violations. See generally Williams, The Influ-
ences of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution on American Constitutionalism During the Founding
Decade, 112 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 25 (1988).
73. 1 P. FONER, supra note 37, at 4.
74. See, e.g., N.Y. Const. (1977), 7 W. SWINDLER, supra note 38, at 168 (1978); Mass.
Const. (1780), 5 W. SWINDLER, supra note 38, at 92 (1975); N.H. Const. (1784), 6 W. SWIN-
DLER, supra note 38, at 344 (1976).
75. 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, at 401
(C. Hyneman & D. Lutz eds. 1983).
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As early as 1776, therefore, the crucial constitutional issues of the
founding decade-how the new governments would be structured and
who would participate in them, directly as officeholders and indirectly as
voters-were joined in the writings of Paine and Adams. These issues
formed the battleground for the contending interests in the state constitu-
tional conventions from 1776 to 1787 and would preview many of the
difficult questions at the federal Constitutional Convention in 1787.76
Adams' ideas ultimately prevailed, though Paine's ideas carried the day
in a few states and influenced the structure of, or at least representation
in, most state legislatures. Historian Elisha Douglass concluded that Ad-
ams' Thoughts on Government was probably the "paramount guide" for
constitution-making in at least five states." And, he continued, "when it
is considered that the state constitutions-particularly that of Massachu-
setts-were the greatest single influence on the federal Constitution, the
full importance of the pamphlet should be evident.""8
Although the tendency to analyze historical events on the basis of
oversimplified dichotomies should be avoided,7 9 it is clear that these two
competing views of governmental structure emerged in the framing of
the state constitutions during the founding decade. As one historian ob-
served, "[t]he dominant and ultimately triumphant [view] was toward
constitutional stability. The other, weaker but still noteworthy, was to-
ward some form of popular council democracy."80
Alfred Young neatly captured the range of possibilities presented to
state constitution drafters during the founding decade."1 In describing
the polar positions of the contending groups leading to what he charac-
terized as the "middle-of-the-road" New York Constitution of 1777,
which marked the beginning of the second wave, Young wrote:
The constitution of 1777 retained many aristocratic features....
At the same time the constitution made several democratic depar-
tures from provincial precedent .... Had extreme conservatives
had their way, they would have gotten elections at four-year inter-
vals by voice voting, an upper house indirectly chosen, a governor
elected by an upper house, and a governor with more of the powers
of his royal predecessors. Had the most democratic elements had
76. See generally Williams, Evolving State Legislative and Executive Power during the
Founding Decade, 496 ANNALS 43 (1988).
77. E. DOUGLASS, supra note 11, at 32.
78. Id.
79. See Kenyon, Republicanism and Radicalism in The American Revolution: An Old-
Fashioned Interpretation, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 153, 154-55 (1962); W. ADAMS, supra note 4, at
147.
80. Countryman, Some Problems of Power in New York 1777-1782, in SOVEREIGN
STATES IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY, supra note 36, at 157, 158-59.
81. A. YOUNG, supra note 28.
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their way, there would have been taxpayer suffrage, a secret ballot
for all elections... annual election of all state officials, and popular
election of county and local officials; furthermore the appointive
power would have been vested exclusively in the assembly and the
governor's veto power would have been eliminated .
2
A. The Legislative Branch in the Early State Constitutions
The primary focus of the radical democrats was on the legislative
branch. In virtually every state, these elements raised issues relating to
broader suffrage, fairer apportionment, annual elections, elimination of
property requirements for holding office, unicameralism, and elimination
of executive interference with legislative policy. Even though only three
states-Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Vermont-adopted unicameral legis-
latures, and most states continued to impose certain property require-
ments for voting and holding office, virtually all the state legislatures of
the founding decade differed distinctly in operation from their colonial
counterparts.
Most of the early state constitutions, although expressly recognizing
the doctrine of separation of powers,83 "tended to exalt legislative power
at the expense of the executive and the judiciary.' 84 This increased legis-
lative dominance came primarily at the expense of the executive, which
had come to be identified with the British Crown against which the colo-
nial assemblies had struggled but never succeeded in achieving anything
more than shared power." With the advent of Independence, this con-
flict with the colonial executive could be completed; 6 the states were free
to structure their governments as they saw fit. James Wilson, a key fed-
eral convention delegate, ruefully noted the "excessive partiality" to the
state legislature, "into [whose] lap, every good and precious gift was
profusely thrown."87 James Madison also warned the Federal Conven-
tion that state legislatures had become "omnipotent" because
"[e]xperience had proved a tendency in our governments to throw all
82. Id. at 20-21. For similar general descriptions of the opposing viewpoints on state
constitutions, see J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 184-85; B. MASON, supra note 31, at 231-34;
Lemisch, supra note 56, at 11-16; Main, supra note 36, at 24-27; Patterson, The Roots of Mas-
sachusetts Federalism: Conservative Politics and Political Culture Before 1787, in SOVEREIGN
STATES IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY, supra note 36, at 31, 42-43.
83. See C. KENYON, supra note 55, at xxix; Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory
Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30
AM. HIST. REV. 511, 514 (1924-1925).
84. W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 21 (1972).
85. For a summary of the powers of the colonial executive, see J. MAIN, supra note 11, at
99-103.
86. Id. at 143-44.
87. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 357 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
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power into the Legislative vortex.",88
In the majority of states, even though bicameral legislatures were
created, the lower houses were clearly the most important.89 Not only
was membership in the lower houses expanded to include "new men"
through reapportionment and lower suffrage and office holding require-
ments, but these bodies also assumed powers formerly exercised by colo-
nial magistracies. 9°
The upper houses in the Revolutionary state constitutions were the
direct descendants of the colonial governor's councils, 91 which per-
formed both executive and legislative functions. Independence brought a
dramatic change to these governmental bodies. Virginia, in 1776, was
the first to call its upper house a "senate." 92 Historian Main concluded,
"[e]ven those senates that were intended to be aristocratic were indelibly
marked by the vigorous democratic movement."93 After the Revolution,
the senators no longer owed their seats to the Crown, but were instead
responsible to the electorate.94 Donald Lutz described the general pic-
ture: "The overall result was that senates were somewhat more con-
servative than lower houses and protected property more carefully; but
they failed to provide a consistent check on lower houses, as had been
intended." 95
The senators began to respond to the electorate in basically the same
way as members of the lower houses were responding. Most states found
themselves in the position Alfred Young described in New York:
From a conservative point of view it was apparent that the
state constitution was not functioning as it was supposed to....
The senators, presumably the protectors of property, "are more ea-
ger in the pursuit of popularity than the Assembly," a Livingston
complained. "The democratical part of the government is always
encroaching."
96
88. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 35 (M. Farrand ed.
1911) [hereinafter M. FARRAND]. See also id. at 74.
89. J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 200.
90. Id. at 205. See also G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 162-63.
91. S. FISCHER, supra note 10, at 72-73.
92. Id. at 75.
93. J. MAIN, THE UPPER HOUSE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 1763-1788, at 99
(1967).
In addition to indirect elections, other conservative features of state senates included high
property qualifications for office, longer terms than for the lower house, and staggered terms.
See D. LUTZ, supra note 12, at 89.
94. D. LUTz, supra note 12, at 89.
95. Id. at 92. See also G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 503-04.
96. A. YOUNG, supra note 28, at 62 (citations omitted).
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B. Governors in the Early State Constitutions
The governorship was profoundly transformed in the first state con-
stitutions from an instrument of British policy during the colonial period
with prerogative powers that included an absolute veto of legislative
acts,9 to a legislatively appointed office almost totally beholden to the
newly dominant state legislatures. After struggling so long against pow-
erful governors, it would have been politically impossible for the newly
independent states to adopt strong governorships. 98 This was true even
though at the time of Independence there was a pressing need for the
exercise of decisive power, particularly in matters arising from the war.99
Although the early state constitutions produced generally weak, leg-
islatively dominated governorships, this result was not unanimous.
South Carolina's conservative 1776 constitution, for example, provided
its president with an absolute veto over legislation." ° The presidential
veto, however, became a target for reformers 0 1 and was eliminated in the
1778 revised constitution adopted by the legislature. John Rutledge, a
future federal convention delegate, had served as president under the
1776 South Carolina Constitution.102 He tried unsuccessfully to exercise
the constitutional veto power to block the 1778 instrument eliminating
that very power,10 3 arguing that the proposal would "annihilate[] one
branch of the legislature.""°
Despite the relatively circumscribed authority of most Revolution-
ary governors, which led James Madison to characterize the position as
"the grave of all useful talents,"105 a number of distinguished leaders in
addition to Rutledge served in the post. Among them were Patrick
Henry, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Harrison in Virginia; John Han-
97. S. FISCHER, supra note 10, at 17; M. JENSEN, supra note 49, at 107; J. MAIN, supra
note 11, at 102.
The exception to this rule was in Rhode Island where neither the governor nor the Crown
had a veto over assembly acts. This led a recent scholar to assert that the "Rhode Island
General Assembly was among the most nearly autonomous legislative bodies in the British
Empire." P. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
VELOPMENT, 1776-1841, at 45 (1977).
98. J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 143-44.
99. See M. MACMILLAN, THE WAR GOVERNORS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 14
(1943).
100. J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 148.
101. R. WALSH, CHARLESTON'S SONS OF LIBERTY: A STUDY OF THE ARTISANS 1763-
1789, at 81-82 (1959).
102. E. DOUGLASS, supra note 11, at 35.
103. J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 148.
104. 1 D. RAMSAY, THE HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 132 (1785).
105. Evans, Executive Leadership in Virginia 1776-1781: Henry, Jefferson and Nelson, in
SOVEREIGN STATES IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY, supra note 36, at 185, 186 (quoting 1 I.
BRANT, JAMES MADISON 316 (1941)).
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cock in Massachusetts; and John Dickinson, who served in both Penn-
sylvania and Delaware.106 Partly as a result of the stature of these
individuals, and partly because they exercised a wide range of statutorily
granted powers beyond those formally reflected in the state constitu-
tions,10 7 it is now recognized that the governors of the founding decade
were more important and their authority more stable than originally
thought.'08
John Jay, the principal drafter of the New York Constitution of
1777, proposed a veto power over legislation that was to be exercised by a
Council of Revision, made up of the governor, the justices of the
Supreme Court, and the chancellor.109 An early draft of the constitution
had proposed a weak governorship, as was found in other states.'" 0 After
considerable delay, the convention adopted the Council of Revision veto
mechanism."'I Included in article III was an express justification stating
the veto power was necessary because "laws inconsistent with the spirit
of this constitution or with the public good may be hastily or inadvisedly
passed.""' 2 Notably, the Council's veto authority was modified, rather
than absolute, in that it could be overridden by the legislature.
New York also provided for the first popularly elected governor,"
13
beginning a trend" 4 toward a republican executive-elected by, and re-
sponsible to, the electorate."15 When George Clinton was elected, par-
tially as a result of the elimination of voice voting, it "ruffled
conservatives.""16
The New York Council of Revision went on to veto fifty-eight legis-
lative enactments prior to the federal Constitutional Convention.
17
John Jay, as Chief Justice, was a Council member." 8 Despite the fact
that the Council of Revision vetoes were often overridden by the legisla-
106. M. MACMILLAN, supra note 99, at 285-86 app.
107. Id. at 72-92. See also J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 191; Evans, supra note 105, at 187.
108. J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 190.
109. See JOHN JAY, supra note 31, at 389-418. Editor Morris reported that Jay had a copy
Of JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776) and was influenced by it. JOHN JAY,
supra note 31, at 390.
110. C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789, at 36 (1923 & photo.
reprint 1969).
111. B. MASON, supra note 31, at 242-43; E. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 41, at 169. See also
A. YOUNG, supra note 28, at 20.
112. N.Y. CONST. art. III (1777), 7 W. SWINDLER, supra note 38, at 172-73 (1978).
113. J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 174. Main concluded, however, that the New York Gover-
nor was not a "democratic creation." Id. at 174-75.
114. B. WRIGHT, CONSENSUS AND CONTINUITY, 1776-1787, at 17-18 (1958).
115. J. MAIN, supra note 11, at 195.
116. A. YOUNG, supra note 28, at 25. See also id. at 22-25.
117. C. THACH, supra note 110, at 39.
118. E. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 41, at 184.
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ture, 119 it provided a model for the presidential veto in the federal
Constitution. 120
The question whether a state constitution should include a guberna-
torial veto became a crucial one in the process leading to the Massachu-
setts Constitution of 1780. John Adams' draft of the Massachusetts
Constitution provided for an absolute gubernatorial veto.12 Elisha
Douglass concluded that Adams' draft was "one of the most conservative
to come from the pen of any Revolutionary leader."' 22 The constitu-
tional convention, after narrowly rejecting the gubernatorial veto, 123 ulti-
mately modified Adams' proposal to permit a legislative override of
gubernatorial vetoes, a change which Adams later said was made "to my
sorrow." 1
2 4
C. Checks and Balances in the Early State Constitutions
The founding decade clearly established a pattern of gradual transi-
tion from the early legislative dominance or "omnipotence", toward an
increased role for the executive and judicial branches. In the early years
of the Revolution, the judiciary had almost been forgotten. If anything,
it was considered part of the executive power that was the target of such
hostility in the early state constitutions. As experience with the domi-
nant legislative branches continued, however, the judiciary and the exec-
utive came to be viewed as a necessary check on legislative
encroachments upon the rights guaranteed by the consitutions and upon
the prerogatives of the other branches.1 25 The new executive and judicial
powers, therefore, operated as checks on recognized legislative power
rather than a sharing of legislative power. It is in this sense that the
concern evolved from preoccupation with separation of powers, which
responded to grievances against the Crown before the Revolution, to-
wards practical mechanisms of checks and balances, in response to the
119. A. YOUNG, supra note 28, at 27.
"Although the Council of Revision returned more vetoes after than during the Revolu-
tion-eight in 1784, and nineteen in 1785-it was often reversed by the legislature .... Id. at
62.
120. E. DOUGLASS, supra note 11, at 65; C. THACH, supra note 110, at 110-16.
121. E. DOUGLASS, supra note 11, at 191.
122. Id.
123. The vote in the convention was 44-32 to reject the veto. Two days later the compro-
mise proposal carried on a vote of 44-24. 0. & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH; A STUDY OF
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861, at
25 n.83 (1947).
124. Id. at 197.
125. G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 452. On the rise of judicial power during the founding
decade, see generally id. at 453-63; M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 157-58 (1967).
states' experiences with legislatively dominated, republican governments
of 1776 to 1787.126
IM. State Constitutions in the Federal Constitutional
Convention: Positive and Negative Models
The delegates to the federal Constitutional Convention, "first-gener-
ation republicans", 117 were obviously well aware of the state constitu-
tions, the debates surrounding them, and the experience governing under
them. Thus, John Dickinson scarcely needed to remind his fellow dele-
gates in Philadelphia on August 13, 1787, that "[e]xperience must be our
only guide." 128  Dickinson was referring to experience, as Douglass
Adair later observed, in a "dual fashion to refer both to political wisdom
gained by participation in events and wisdom gained by studying past
events." '129 In fact, Dickinson placed more weight on the long view of
history than the events of the founding decade. This is clear from his
responses to delegates James Wilson and James Madison, who had
warned of the problems experienced by states whose constitutions re-
quired that money bills only be initiated by the lower house of the legisla-
ture.13 0 "Shall we," queried Dickinson, "oppose to this long [English]
experience, the short experience of 11 years which we had ourselves, on
this subject[?]"'' 31 Still, however, this exchange illustrates the foremost
place in the Framers' minds occupied by the still unfolding state consti-
tutional developments.
James Madison, in discussing the proposed seven-year term for sen-
ators said; "It was to be much lamented that we had so little direct expe-
rience to guide us. The Constitution of Maryland was the only one that
bore any analogy to this part of the plan." 132 Later, when arguing for a
required three-fourths majority to override a presidential veto, Madison
126. M. VILE, supra note 125, at 125-34, 141; Corwin, supra note 83; Williams, supra note
76.
127. C. KENYON, supra note 55, at xxxviii.
128. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 88, at 278, quoted in D. ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUND-
ING FATHERS: ESSAYS BY DOUGLASS ADAIR 107, 109 (1974). Dickinson noted that "Eight
States have inserted in their Constitutions the exclusive right of originating money bills in
favor the popular branch of the Legislature." Id. at 278.
129. D. ADAIR, supra note 128, at 110.
130. See id. at 109. Wilson had argued that permitting only the lower house to originate
money bills "had been found pregnant with altercation in every State where the Constitution
had established it." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 275.
131. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 278.
"When, therefore, the convention assembled, virtually the only experience on which the
members could draw in prosecuting the work before them was that of the state conventions of
the last dozen years." J. JAMESON, supra note 9, at 18.
132. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 218.
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cautioned: "It was an important principle in this & in the State Constitu-
tions to check legislative injustice and incroachments. The Experience of
the States has demonstrated that their checks are insufficient."1 33 In op-
posing a restriction on eligibility of members of Congress to hold other
governmental positions, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts argued
that the "experience of the State Governments where there was no such
ineligibility, proved that it was not necessary ....
The nature of constitution-making was captured by Elbridge Gerry
when he reminded the Convention: "We must make concessions on both
sides. Without these the constitutions of the several States would never
have been formed." '35 Madison gave further expression to this sentiment
when he argued for popular ratification of the federal Constitution "be-
cause the new national constitution ought to have the highest source of
authority, at least paramount to the powers of the respective constitu-
tions of the states ....
A. Positive Models
With many federal constitutional provisions modelled on state ex-
amples, it is quite clear that state constitutions had numerous positive
influences on the federal Constitution. The most widely recognized of
these is the Bill of Rights which, of course, was not added until several
years after the Convention of 1787.137 George Mason, drafter of Vir-
133. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 587.
In arguing that the Ex Post Facto Clause would not be an effective check, Madison cited
state examples of ex post facto laws enacted despite constitutional prohibitions, concluding
that "experience overruled all other calculations." Id. at 376.
134. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 491.
135. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 515.
The report of the Committee of Detail stressed that the Constitution should "use simple
and precise language, and general propositions, according to the example of the (several) con-
stitutions of the several states." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 137.
136. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 126.
137. Even the Bill of Rights' origins in state constitutions and earlier colonial and English
materials had been more or less forgotten until recently. In 1975, Justice Mosk of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court had to remind the bar and bench:
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually
identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart. The
lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based upon the corresponding
provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the reverse.
People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329 (1975).
As to the English origins of the state declarations of rights, William Webster noted:
The bills of rights of the American Revolution are only a link in a long chain of
institutional development, running back through the English Bill of Rights and Peti-
tion of Rights to Magna Charta, and all these formal expressions were only crystalli-
zations of previous institutional development.
Webster, supra note 3, at 384.
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ginia's famous 1776 Declaration of Rights, had urged the Convention to
include a Bill of Rights. As the records of the proceeding noted: "He
wished the plan had been prefaced with a Bill of Rights, and would sec-
ond a Motion if made for the purpose-It would give great quiet to the
people; and with the aid of the State declarations, a bill might be pre-
pared in a few hours."13
The absence of a Bill of Rights from the proposed constitution was
among the most well-known and effective of the antifederalist arguments
against ratification. 139 Because the evolution of the Bill of Rights, in-
cluding the influence of state constitutions, has been ably treated else-
where, 1" it is the area least in need of study. We should focus rather on
the debates over participation in, and the structure of, governmental in-
stitutions under the new state constitutions and the influence of these
matters on the federal Constitution. Furthermore, the real controversies
over the first state constitutions had little to do with "rights." What was
at stake was how the new state governments would be structured and
what groups in society would have the dominant role in making policy
under the new governments. The question of "rights" as we think of
them today was not at the forefront of these debates. 141
In addition to the Bill of Rights, numerous other state constitutional
provisions positively influenced the federal Constitution, including the
development of the executive branch and the Senate. The recognition of
138. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 587-88.
139. C. KENYON, supra note 55, at lxx-lxxi.
140. For materials tracing the influence of state constitutions on the Bill of Rights, see for
example, Z. CHAFEE, JR., How HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION (1952); S.
FISHER, supra note 10, at 190-211; A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA
CHARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1968); G. OSTRANDER, THE RIGHTS OF
MAN IN AMERICA, 1606-1861 (1969); R. RUTLAND, supra note 35, at 119-25; B. SCHWARTZ,
THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 198-99
(1977); SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES (R. Perry ed. 1959); Dumbauld, State Precedents for the
Bill of Rights, 7-J. PUB. L. 323 (1958).
For a provocative new treatment of the early state bills of rights, see W. NELSON & R.
PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC 55-86 (1987).
141. The bills of rights in the first state constitutions were valuable as the basis for
restricting the sphere of governmental authority and as expressions of liberal political
philosophy, but they did nothing to make government more responsive to the people.
The attainment of democracy required political equality and majority rule.
E. DOUGLASS, supra note 11, at 133. See also G. WOOD, supra note 11, at 61-62; Katz, The
Origins of American Constitutional Thought, 3 PERSP. AM. HIST. 474 (1969):
For a long time, American political theorists and constitutional historians have
been looking at things the wrong way round. They have sought the origins of the Bill
of Rights, judicial review, and federalism, but they have seldom asked how an or-
ganic American view of constitutional government emerged out of the society, poli-
tics, and thoughts of the colonial era.
Id. at 488-89.
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this positive modelling is obvious from John Adams' boast: "I made a
Constitution for Massachusetts, which finally made the Constitution of
the United States."142 Although clearly an oversimplification, Adams'
claim contains an important element of truth.1 43 Alexander Hamilton,
not surprisingly, relied on positive modelling in the very first number of
The Federalist, where he assured New Yorkers that the new federal Con-
stitution was an "analogy to your own State constitution .... 144
B. Negative Models
It is also now more clear that by 1787, after more than a decade of
experience with the state governments, there were some state institutions
and practices that a majority of the Framers did not wish to emulate.
This was particularly true with respect to the widespread dominance of
the legislative branch under most state constitutions. In introducing the
Virginia Plan, Edmund Randolph, governor of Virginia, warned the dele-
gates that "[o]ur chief danger arises from the democratic parts of our
[state] constitutions .... None of the constitutions have provided suffi-
cient checks against the democracy."' 145 James Wilson of Pennsylvania
echoed this concern when he admonished: "Where do the people look at
present for relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it from an
internal reform of their Govt.? No. Sir, it is from the Natl. Councils
that relief is expected."' 46 Wilson had been an opponent of the 1776
Pennsylvania Constitution and many of the legislative policies of the
period.
142. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 28, 1807), quoted in R. PETERS,
supra note 24, at 14.
143. Adams was probably more accurate when he said in 1788: "What is the Constitution
of the United States... but that of Massachusetts, New York and Maryland. There is not a
feature of it which can not be found in one or the other." C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILA-
DELPHIA 199 (1966).
144. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 6 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library ed. 1937).
There are references, both favorable and unfavorable, to the state constitutions through-
out THE FEDERALIST. In Number 47, for example, Madison criticized the state constitutions
for their failure adequately to separate governmental powers. Id. No. 47, at 316-20 (J.
Madison). He continued this criticism in Number 48. Id. No. 48, at 323-26 (J. Madison).
In Number 69, Hamilton defended the proposed four-year term for the President by refer-
ring to the "close analogy between him and a governor of New York, who is elected for three
years.. ." Id. No. 69, at 446 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original). In Number 81, Hamilton
lauded the proposed federal Constitution's independent judicial power (with no final appeal to
the legislature), noting that it was not "novel and unprecedented" but was rather "a copy of
the constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia; and the preference which has been given
to those models is highly to be commended." Id. No. 81, at 525 (A. Hamilton).
145. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 26-27 (James McHenry's notes), quoted in M.
JENSEN, supra note 49, at 169. See also W. ADAMS, supra note 4, at 113.
146. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 128, at 253.
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Concern about what was taking place in the states by 1786 to 1787,
viewed by some as a crisis, was as important a stimulus for the Constitu-
tional Convention as the perceived defects in the Articles of Confedera-
tion. James Madison noted this during the Convention, and reiterated
the point in a letter to Thomas Jefferson just after the Convention
closed.' 4 7 Historian Edward Corwin observed that "at least of equal ur-
gency [to replacing the Articles of Confederation] were the questions
which were thrust upon [the Convention's] attention by the shortcomings
of the state governments for their purposes."1 48 More recently, Gordon
Wood has argued that:
The Constitution created a national government whose strength
and character were out of proportion to the obvious and acknowl-
edged weaknesses of the confederation .... Only political condi-
tions in the states-political conditions of the most threatening
kind-can ultimately explain the creation of the Constitution....
By the 1780's many American leaders realized that these state as-
semblies were abusing their extraordinary powers.... These legis-
lative abuses, many American leaders believed, flowed from too
much democracy.
149
These concerns, leading to the Convention of 1787, prompted historian
Staunton Lynd to refer to the federal Constitution as "the settlement of a
revolution." 150
In view of this reaction to perceived "excesses of democracy" made
possible by the constitutions of most states, it is clear that state constitu-
tional models exerted negative influences on the drafting of the federal
Constitution. A "reform caucus",' the Constitutional Convention set
out to reform not only the Articles of Confederation but also the state
governments as they were constituted in 1787. This reform was accom-
plished indirectly by the enumerated powers of Congress contained in
147. Id. at 134. Madison noted the "necessity, of providing more effectively for the secur-
ity of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils
which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced this convention." Id. See also Letter
from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787) in J. BOYD, supra note 29, at 276; M. JENSON, supra
note 50, at 193; B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 4-5 (1938).
148. Corwin, supra note 83, at 513. Corwin noted that James Madison viewed increased
national power as an antidote to the "swollen prerogatives of the state legislatures." Id. at 536.
See also D. LuTz, supra note 12, at 118-19; Wood, Interests and Disinteredness in the Making
of the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 69, 70-77 (R. Beeman, S. Botein & E. Carter eds. 1987).
149. Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITU-
TION?, supra note 40, at 6-8.
150. S. LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 113
(1967). Others have referred to the federal Constitution as a "second revolution," C. THACH,
supra note I10, at 23.
151. See Roche, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 799 (1961).
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Article I, such as exclusive power over issuing money and determining
legal tender, I52 which operated to diminish the power of state legisla-
tures. It was accomplished more directly through the Article I prohibi-
tions on state legislatures, including the Contract Clause 53 and the
clause guaranteeing'the states a republican form of government.
1 54
The negative influence of state constitutional experience may also be
seen in the development of the separation of powers, and checks and
balances features of the federal Constitution. While this had no direct
effect on the states, unlike the aggregation of federal power in Article I, it
reflected strong and fundamental disapproval by a majority of the Fram-
ers of the way most state governments were constituted. These negative
influences are further reflected in the debates and the Federalist defenses
of the Constitution which criticized the abuses, primarily of property and
contract rights, I55 by state legislatures exercising vast authority under
their constitutional schemes.156
Finally, at the time the Constitutional Convention met in 1787 a
number of insurrections in the states, the most serious being Shays' Re-
bellion in Massachusetts, had generated a genuine fear that the states
were unstable and vulnerable to "mob rule." ' George Washington, for
example, warned of "combustibles in every state, which a spark might set
fire to."'1 58 To a certain extent, Shays' Rebellion must be seen as a con-
troversy over the way Massachusetts' government, particularly the legis-
lative branch with its conservative senate, was constituted. 5 9 Fear of
local insurrections, combined with the clear inability of the Congress
under the Articles of Confederation to deal with such problems, thus
were additional major stimuli for the move to a stronger central
government.
152. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 5; art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See generally B. WRIGHT, supra note 147 (describing
the background and evolution of the Contract Clause).
154. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See generally W. WIECEK, supra note 84 (describing the
background and evolution of the Guaranty Clause).
155. "No theme is more pervasive in the political thought of America than the constant
fear of redistribution of wealth or, as it was called, of tyranny of the majority." Horowitz, The
Legacy of 1776 in Legal and Economic Thought, 19 J.L. & ECON. 621, 622 (1976).
156. See supra notes 145-149 and accompanying text.
157. "A fear of rebellion and violent overthrow of the state governments dogged these men
and prompted them to arrange the Philadelpha Convention." W. WIECEK, supra note 84, at
27-28. See also C. THACH, supra note 110, at 17-19.
158. M. JENSEN, supra note 49, at 158.
159. See generally P. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN
INSURRECTION (1980) (treating the influences of Shays' rebellion on the Constitution); Feer,
Shays's Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation, 42 NEw ENG. Q. 388 (1969);
Pole, Shays's Rebellion: A Political Interpretation, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-1789, at 416 (J. Greene ed. 1968).
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Conclusion
The Constitution, and the delegates who framed it, have been ana-
lyzed and studied from a number of different perspectives. 60 For exam-
ple, Charles Beard argued that the economic interests of the Framers
were the dominant influence leading to the Constitution.' 6' Others
sought to refute such claims. 162 Douglass Adair asserted that the Fram-
ers were motivated primarily by their desire for fame and immortality.
63
Still others emphasize the Framers' youth, energy, and political skill."~
While cautioning that they were by no means the exclusive influ-
ence, or necessarily even the most important influence, this Article as-
serts that experience with the developing state constitutions in the
"laboratories" of the founding decade was a major formative influence on
the constitutional philosophy of most of the Framers. The Framers had
both positive and negative experiences with the state constitutions of this
period. The underlying texts and political theories of the state constitu-
tions, together with the experience of living and governing under them,
formed the bridge between the federal Constitution and earlier American
constitutionalism. As historian Richard Beeman recently noted, "[I]t is
now becoming apparent that it may only be through studies of legal and
constitutional development in the individual states that we will be able to
discover where we have been."'1
6 5
160. For an excellent review of the waves of historical writing on the Constitution, see
Hutson, supra note 2, at 1. On the broader question of interpretations of the Revolution, see
Appleby, Liberalism and the American Revolution, 49 NEW ENG. Q. 3 (1976); Greene, The
Social Origins of the American Revolution: An Evaluation and an Interpretation, 88 POL. ScI.
Q. I (1973); Kirby, Early American Politics-The Search for Ideology: An Historiographical
Analysis and Critique of the Concept of "Deference", 32 J. POL. 808 (1970).
161. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913).
162. See, ag. R. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF "AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION" (1956); F. Mc-
DONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS ON THE CONSTITUTION (1958). For a
revival and extension of Beard's basic thesis, see S. LYND, supra note 150, at 3-21.
163. D. ADAIR, supra note 128, at 3.
164. Elkins & McKitrick, The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution, 76 POL.
Sc. Q. 181 (1961); Roche, supra note 151, at 799.
165. Beeman, Introduction, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION, supra note 148, at 3, 18.
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